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The political socialization of youth in the Soviet Union was recognized bv the early
Bolsheviks as critical to the future of the new socialist society. Their efforts included plans
for Unified Labor Schools and compulsory education to develop a literate and politically-
aware proletarian force to continue the communist struggle. Later schools and political
socialization became a matter of strict Communist Party control from the smallest Octobrist
unit to the Young Pioneer zarnitsa camps to the university Komsomol organizations.
Despite the vast resources dedicated to vospitanie and Basic Military Training for youth,
these socialization efforts were remarkably unsuccessful in producing the New Soviet Man.
This lack of success in political socialization was clearly demonstrated by numerous factors,
among them the many youth resisting the draft prior to the break up of the Soviet Union,
the speed of that break up, the emerging ties to the capitalist west, and the lack of faith in
the economy. This does not mean that 70 years of life in a communist society did not
socialize the youth to some extent. This research suggests that they were more affected by
the lack of information about non-communist topics, such as a market economy and
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For most Americans, the mere mention of political socialization in the Soviet
Union has long evoked images of Young Pioneers laying flowers at Lenin's mausoleum
or Pravda headlines about the evils of the capitalist west. However, the truth behind
these rituals went much, much deeper. From their cradles, Soviet children were
subjected to systematic efforts in political socialization by the state. It is impossible to
describe the many different indoctrination efforts that were at work in the Soviet Union.
There were probably as many indoctrination techniques as there were people in the
Communist Party. Differences were based on resources and priorities, and thus the
"universal" program fell far short of its billing. However, political socialization was
definitely a priority at some level. For instance, some type of preinduction training and
military-patriotic education certainly were part of everyone's life. However, the success
of the program is questionable. Obviously, they did not develop Soviet patriotism and
a desire to defend the socialist motherland in all young people. The eruption of
independence-seeking nations throughout the ex-Soviet republics indicates that they did
not achieve internationalism. Apparently, they did not even achieve enough success for
these issues to overcome the economic and social realities of life in recent times.
Why this lack of success in vospitanie, or the proper upbringing of youth? There
are undoubtedly as many reasons as there are people involved. Reports from the
paramilitary DOSAAF organizations (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army,
Air Force, and Fleet) show that interest in military training has dropped considerably.
While the numbers of participants often look good on paper, it was usually the same
youth who participated in everything, not all youth participating in at least something.
The youth groups faced similar problems. While children eagerly joined the Octobrists,
interest dropped off drastically for the Komsomol. There was apparently a cut-off point
about the age of fifteen, after which the majority of youth were no longer swayed by the
youth groups.
Another factor was the idealism of the youth. Unfortunately for the Communists,
they were soon disillusioned. They became aware of the hypocrisy of adult society, and
the existence of a facade that was very different from reality. This contradiction, and the
hypocrisy with which the authorities faced it, soon undermined and repudiated years
of vospitanie .
Glasnost had a significant effect as well. As society became more open about life
in general, and about abuses in the Communist Party in particular, the propaganda had
increasingly less effect. A similar circumstance was seen with World War II, when the
soldiers exposed to the West saw life under capitalism to be different from the way the
Communist Party described it. With glasnost, the Soviet public was less and less
dependent on government news sources and added the possibility of the widespread
exchange of information among Soviets without the effect of government censorship.
The more this happened, the more people began to blame the communist system for
breeding corruption, in addition to the corrupt officials with whom they had to deal.
After years of tolerating small lies, people were openly disillusioned with their
government and the Communist Party.
This does not mean, however, that the years of growing up under communism
did not socialize the people. The inertia there is tremendous. A country the size of
Russia will take years, possible even generations, to complete the change to democracy,
vi
and their communist upbringing can only make this more difficult. However, this
research suggests that this background affected the Soviets more by denying them other
information than by convincing them that the communists' information was correct. The
complete lack of knowledge on market economies, private enterprise, and democratic




For most Americans, the mere mention of political socialization in the Soviet
Union has long evoked images of Young Pioneers laving flowers at Lenin's
mausoleum, or Pravda headlines about the evils of the capitalist west. However,
the truth behind these rituals goes much, much deeper. From their cradles, Soviet
children were subjected to systematic efforts in political socialization by the state.
That this socialization effort failed to prevent opposition to the coup, or the
breakup of the Soviet Union, must have stunned die-hard Communists the world
over. Now that the Soviet Union has disbanded and the Communist struggle has
been formally dropped, what impact will years of this socialization have on
Russia? This paper will investigate the socialization process involved, the extent
of its acceptance, and the possible effect it will have on future Russian relations
with western nations.
When the Soviet Union began, the Communists were embroiled in World
War I, followed by several years of a civil war which threatened not only the
success of the revolution but the very existence of the Soviet state. The
Communists of the time realized that the proletariat as a political force did not
yet exist. Creating such a class became one of their main goals, and was seen as
necessary to achieve world communism. They quickly took over what schools
then existed, directing them to produce "the new Soviet man". Debate on the way
to accomplish this continued for several years, finally solidifying under Stalin.
This paper will focus on the system under which today's Russian work force
and voting population grew up. This was a rigorous system that dictated their
training and education from the time they first went to preschool or kindergarten.
While the Soviets recognized that there were limits to what such young children
could learn, they put a definite emphasis on building the foundations for later
learning. The children's experiences here ranged from learning how to get along
with others to singing songs of Lenin and the Red Armv.
At age seven, the Soviet child joined the school system as a first-grader.
Political socialization at this stage was more overt and prevalent in the classroom.
It permeated all subjects, in addition to courses dedicated totally to political
topics. Also, all students were given an introduction to military training as part
of their school curriculum.
The last major element of political socialization in the Soviet Union that will
be discussed here is the Communist youth groups. Ranging from the Little
Octobrists in elementary school to Young Pioneers to the Komsomol, youth
groups for years were the only source of extracurricular activities. This was a
powerful motivator for many, who joined simply to take part in summer camps
and sports.
The final part of this paper is an examination of the success or failure of
their efforts in the area of political socialization. The issue of success or failure
will be analyzed by comparing recent events with their own definition of proper
upbringing of vouth, or vospitanie . In many ways, the results fell far short of the
desired ones, especially considering the amount of resources dedicated to this
effort. However, some areas have achieved a significant effect that will last long
after the Soviet Union itself.
II. THE BEGINNINGS
A. THE BASIS FOR VOSPITANIE
When the Soviet Union began, more than seventy years ago, the Russian
Empire was engrossed in a World War. This inauspicious beginning was
followed by several years of a civil war, threatening the success of the revolution
and the very existence of the Soviet state, and leading those in charge to the
conclusion that they must always be ready to fight. As the "vanguard of the
proletariat", the Communist Party immediately saw that they would have to lead
the people if they were to achieve communism, controlling society along the
desired course of history. The proletarian class, according to Karl Marx, was
supposed to accomplish the revolution, not be a product of it. Lenin, however,
saw the proletariat as crucial to the Soviet system even after the revolution. An
active proletariat was the only way he saw to accomplish the world revolution.
Russia, however, had but the merest vestige of a proletarian class. The vast
majority of the population consisted of illiterate peasants, the 'Dark People'. Only
about 35 percent of the population was literate, and that was defined as being
able to write one's own name — hardly adequate for political activity! 1 An
immediate challenge for the new regime was to develop a working class and
'Joseph I. Zajda, Education in the USSR (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980),
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transform the 'Dark People' into a proletarian force. This required a mass literacy
effort and a universal school system which would instill communist values.
Lenin has been credited with saying "Give us the child for eight years and it will
be a Bolshevik forever." 2 Education and political socialization were seen as the
keys to transforming the peasantry into socialist citizens. With this in mind, the
Communist Party immediately set about transforming the mass of the population
into the "new Soviet man".
Lenin recognized that the peasantry was thoroughly entrenched in such
"bourgeois" values as religion and the ownership of private property. While he
used this knowledge to his advantage during the civil war with slogans for peace,
land, and bread, he did not give up on communist ideals. Once in power, he was
more concerned about maintaining the Bolshevik's position and achieving a
communist society. These were long-term goals, and their success was dependent
on future generations. That Lenin was aware of this was made clear in his speech
at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League:
Only be radically remolding the teaching, organization, and training of the
youth shall we be able to ensure that the results of the efforts of the younger
2100 Things You Should Know About Communism, prepared for the
Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 46-48,
(1951), House Document 82-136, quoted in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of
Quotations Requested for the Congressional Research Service, ed. Suzy Piatt
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1989), 42. Lenin was, however, hardly
the first to come up with this concept, and this quotation can be found in several
versions from several other sources.
generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old
society, i.e., a Communist society. 3
Immediately after the revolution, the Soviet education system was organized to
accomplish this task. Attention was focussed on the concept of the "new Soviet
Man," who would be capable of building socialism, forcibly if necessary. The goal
of the Soviet education and youth group system was to create this new Soviet
man. This enormous undertaking was to be accomplished through vospitanie .
While not directly translatable, this usually entails "moral education and
upbringing" or "character training and the development of personality."4
Through the years, this goal developed into specific objectives for the education
and youth group systems. They were generally broken out into eleven
components of vospitanie :
1. Socio-political awareness (to make citizens politically active and literate)
2. Moralitv and ethics
3. Patriotism and internationalism (to encourage love of the socialist
motherland and worldwide proletarian solidarity)
4. Military-patriotic education (to develop the desire to defend the
motherland)
3Ken Geiger, "Winning Over the Youth," in Soviet Society: A Book of
Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1961), 546, reprinted from Lenin: Selected Works, II, (Moscow, 1947), 661.
4James Muckle, "The New Soviet Child: Moral Education in Soviet Schools,"
in The Making of the Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York: Croom Helm,
1987), 2.
5. Labor education and professional orientation
6. Mental development and the raising of general culture
7. Atheism




While many of these elements seem benign, it is important to look behind them
to their content to realize the true extent of the socialization intended.
B. THE EARLY YEARS: UNIFIED LABOR SCHOOLS
Since political socialization was so important to the Soviet svstem, it is not
very surprising that a tremendous effort was dedicated to vospitanie in the
education system right from the start. The early propositions for the Soviet
school were highly ideological, and quite impractical. The first, appearing during
the civil war period, was the Unified Labor School, which would provide
nine years of polytechnical education as well as shoes, clothing, hot
breakfasts, medical care, and academic materials free of charge to all
children regardless of gender or social origin; little or no homework; no
standard textbooks, promotion, or graduation examinations or grades;
socially useful exercises as part of the standard curriculum; the study and
5Muckle, 2.
practice of labor; and self-government for each school in which the public,
parents, and pupils would play a vital role. 6
This plan for Soviet education, however, was economical]v impossible throughout
the entire Soviet period. The early Bolsheviks had no chance to implement the
Unified Labor School on a broad scale.
Impervious to the demands of political or fiscal reality, the Commissariat of
Enlightenment, responsible for the communist education of youth, next proceeded
to develop a curriculum for this school: the complex method. This involved
focussing on a series of themes relating to nature, labor, and societv, all highly
susceptible to political propaganda, rather than specific subjects like reading and
writing. This method was largely unsuccessful because both the parents and
teachers did not like it, and claimed their children were "going to school but not
learning." This period illustrated the conflicting goals of parents and the regime
for education, as well as the relative freedom of the day. The conflict was even
more pronounced in the countryside, where peasants regarded the complex
themes as "Bolshevik mumbo-jumbo."7
C STALIN'S REFORMS
By the late 1920's, the Communists had come to the conclusion that it was
necessary to adjust their methods. Clearly the complex method was not
6Larry E. Holmes, "Soviet Schools: Policy Pursues Practice, 1921-1928,"Slavic
Review 48, No. 2 (Summer 1989), 235.
7Holmes, 236-241.
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producing the skilled workers and active citizens needed for the continuing
socialist revolution, but, just as clearly, the Communists were not willing to give
up their political goals for education. The resulting compromise brought back the
course structure, grades, and discipline of tsarist education while deeply
integrating political propaganda.8 This compromise occurred at the close of the
New Economic Period, mirroring the increasing changes in society. As Joseph
Stalin increased the controls on society in general, schools became more
controlled, more disciplined. The free-thinking form of education rapidly
disappeared, along with an entire school of thought: pedology. These changes
included a return to formal examinations, standardized textbooks, and strict
classroom discipline. 4
Reforms were primarily made to improve literacy, math, science, and
technical skills in future workers. The curriculum was remarkably similar to the
tsarist curriculum, with the noted exceptions of religion, philosophy, and law.
Under the Soviets, however, the classical education emphasized in tsarist schools
was turned to an emphasis on the sciences and the skills needed to build
communism.
Another area of major change during Stalin's era was the nationality issue




"as a necessary means not only of international understanding but of recognition
of the heights of the artistic achievements of Russia's writer's, whose works have
found world-wide recognition.""' In the republics acquired after the Second
World War, this anti-nationalist view hit an extreme. A description of the
changes in Estonia's schools following their annexation says "there was no room
in these books for Estonian history, or for that of any people except the
Russians." 11
D. SUMMARY
The early Soviets recognized the important role of education and
socialization in achieving communism in the Soviet Union. The salient points to
this education were found in the elements of vospitanie . In addition to more
benign emphases, the content of these elements also included preparing the youth
for military service and military, economic, and political war against the capitalist
West in their struggle for communism. The Communist Party began a literacy
campaign and developed their own schools from the very beginning. Despite
some early opposition to experimental forms, by the end of the New Economic
Period Stalinist controls dominated the Soviet school system.
10Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the
Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1989), 186.
"Hermann Rajamaa, The Moulding of Soviet Citizens: A Glance at Soviet
Educational Theory and Practice (London: Boreas Publishing, 1948), 28.
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III. THE PRE-SCHOOL YEARS
There were two major instruments of political socialization during the Soviet
child's pre-school years: the preschool and the family. Suspicious of the influence
of older family members, the state would have liked to have been the sole
instrument of child rearing in the country, but was physically incapable
throughout the entire communist regime. Even for today's generation, only
approximately 20 percent of Soviet children attended preschool. The remainder
were raised by their mothers or grandmothers until they entered school at age
seven.
12 The highest percentages of children attending preschools were found
in urban areas, where significantly more attended. From 1945 to 1965, urban
enrollment was around 80 percent while rural enrollment varied between 10 to
20 percent. This was based on two factors: the availability of preschools and the
willingness of the mothers to put their children in state institutions at very young
ages. In the cities, economic conditions frequently required both parents to work,
and had removed the nuclear family from the extended family that was often
available to raise young children in rural areas. This made urban families more
dependent on the state system of child care, and resulted in more urban children
12Robert A. Clawson, "Politcal Socialization of Children in the USSR," in The
Political Science Quarterly Vol. 88, No. 4 (December 1973): 703.
11
receiving their early childhood education in state preschools than rural
children. 13
A. THE PRESCHOOL
Like the rest of the Soviet system, the tenets of preschool education have
undergone considerable changes through the years. For the current generation
of adults, the Soviets had come to the conclusion that not much of the early
childhood political training was understood or absorbed, and therefore it was not
worth a considerable investment. Instead, the preschools were supposed to
mold basic character traits, personal attitudes, and habits which lay the
correct foundation for later, more overt, political socialization provided by
the schools and communist youth groups such as the Octobrists, the
Pioneers, and the Komsomols. 14
This did not mean, however, that there were no elements of vospitanie present.
Certainly, any preschool would have included activities contributing to physical
and aesthetic education, for example. However, these concepts were not the only
ones presented to the child.
Among other components of vospitanie, military-patriotic education was a
part of a child's experience from the very start. This exposure actually began
before school started, in the home and preschools. Preschool children learned




at the time, but became a part of their childhood. By the late 1960s, military toys
and games were prominent in stores. Children's books glorified military life at
all ages. One of the most extreme examples was one for preschoolers titled "We
Pick Up New Rifles" that showed small children being issued rifles and repelling
the enemy. 15
Another universally present form of political socialization in the preschools
was the presence of Lenin, and for a time Stalin. Every room had a picture of
Lenin looking smiling paternally down on the pupils in "Lenin corners." Children
heard stories of Lenin's life and sang nursery rhymes on being "Lenin's
Grandchildren."
We are not yet Pioneers
We are not yet Octobrists
But we know who we are for sure
We are Lenin's Grandchildren!
We are Lenin's Grandchildren! 16
Other nursery rhymes also followed the Communist theme:
November seventh it is clear
Is the reddest day in all the year
Through the window look ahead
Everything outside is red! 17
15
Scott, 329. The book in question was published by Vladimir Mayakovskiy,
Kaliningrad Truth Publishing House, 1970.
16Kitty Weaver, Russia's Future: The Communist Education of Soviet Youth
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 2.
17Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer, "A New Soviet Military! The Next
Generation," Orbis: A Tournal of World Affairs (Spring 1989): 198.
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B. THE HOME
At home, mothers were encouraged to "supplement these early efforts by
promoting patriotism in their children at home." 1 * While harboring no illusions
of vast successes in vospitanie in the homes, the state at the very least wanted to
curb the undesired influence of "religious and superstitious thought" from old
grandmothers and any others who might contaminate the child.' 1" The threat of
prosecution by the state was undoubtedly a larger factor throughout most of
Soviet history than the desire to bring up their children in a socialist mold.
Television, another major influence and often used as a babysitter, had war films
filling half of the programming. With war becoming a part of his daily life, the
child became accustomed to the noise of guns and fighting. 20
However, the most important tasks assigned to the family with regards to
early childhood vospitanie involved raising the child with a respect for authority,
obedience to adults, and self-discipline. The child was to be introduced to the
concept of the collective, where "his chief responsibility was not to himself, but
rather to those immediately around him." The child was also supposed to be
18D.T. Yazov, On Guard Over Socialism and Peace (London: BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 1988), 121, translated from Yazov's Na Strazhe sotsializma
i mira (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), quoted in Nelson and Schwartz.
19Clawson, 700.
20Victor Hermann and Fred E. Dohrs, Realities: Might and Paradox in Soviet
Russia, (Southfield, MI: Independent Publishers, Inc., 1982), 137.
14
exposed to the "internalization of the work ethic" which would theoretically
convince him that he was responsible to the rest of the Soviet people for the work
he would or would not do later in life. 21 However, it is worth noting here that
the only aspect of this in which the government was actually involved was
receiving the finished product at age seven when she or he reported for the first
day of school. This is basically at the very end of Lenin's eight years, which
means the home influence for those who did not go to preschool could have
already permanently socialized the child in non-Communist values.
C SUMMARY
Soviet education authorities would have preferred that all children be raised
by the state in nurseries and preschools. This would have prevented their
"contamination" with non-socialist ideas by mothers and grandmothers in early
childhood. However, this was economically infeasible for the Soviet state. The
authorities eventually recognized that political themes were too difficult for small
children and altered their goals to concentrate on the basic character traits needed
for the New Soviet Man, such as respect for authority and self-discipline.
21Clawson, 700.
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IV. THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
A. VOSPITANIE IN THE SCHOOLS
At age seven, the Soviet child progressed to political socialization in the
school system. This was present throughout the child's entire education, and
irrespective of his course of study. By the time Soviet schools had stabilized after
Stalin's death, courses on Marxism-Leninism and CPSU history took up at least
12-15 percent of the university curriculum, not to mention that of the general
education system. 22 This applied across the board, regardless of specialty, to
ensure that the students continued to be inculcated in the elements of vospitanie .
These, and similar social studies courses formed an overt effort at political
socialization, obvious even to the students themselves. However, these courses
were not the sum total of vospitanie in the schools. Every area considered it, and
included it in their studies and activities. For this research, the areas affected by
the goals of vospitanie will be considered separately.
B. LITERACY AND LITERATURE COURSES
Literature and literacy courses can have a significant impact on young
children, as was realized early in the development of Soviet education. Just as
^Mervyn Matthews, Soviet Students -- Some Sociological Perspectives," Soviet
Studies Vol XXVII (1975): 101.
16
Americans are familiar with "See Spot Run," Soviet children were thought to
ingrain the morals and values portrayed in elementary readers. A primary school
reader showed clearly how reading developed into more significant efforts at
vospitanie as the child grows older. Children learned to read by "savoring such
topics as 'Lenin's Childhood/ 'How Lenin Studied,' 'Lenin and the Red Army/
and so on." 2 ^ One second grade reader included poems on "Lenin's
Grandchildren," discussions of holidays, and questions such as "What is a
collective?", introducing the students to concepts thought to be important for later
life.
24 The corresponding third grade reader opens to the Soviet national
anthem, portrayed with bright pictures of Soviet accomplishments and the flag.
This book includes a chapter on "The Life of Lenin" and sets of questions and
assignments on the communist theme. Some examples of these are writing on
"The life of children before the revolution" and "Why do the Soviet people mark
7 November as the most important holiday?"2 ^ By the fourth grade reader, all
the children pictured were wearing the red scarves of the Pioneers, which would
tend to suggest to the reader that they should be, too. This book included one
^Fred Hiatt, "Moscow School Books Still Glorifying Lenin, Communism," The
Sunday Herald (September 8, 1991): 16A, from the Washington Post.
24T.G. Ramzaeva, Russkii Yazik: Uchebnik dla 2 Klassa Chetirexhletne
Nachalnoy Shkoli, 4th ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 21, 46, 78-137. The
book also has a picture on the cover of a girl wearing her red star and writing
"ro-di-na" on the board.
^Rodnoe Slovo: Uchebnik po Chtenvo dla Uchashchuxhletne Nachalnoy
Shkoli v Dvuxh Chastyaxh (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 98-9, 132-3, 163.
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particularly interesting section entitled "Labor. What a Wonderful Word!"2 '' The
amount of time and energy devoted to learning and repeating these types of
simple phrases and stories on Lenin, Communist concepts, and the glory of
Communism could not help but socialize the children to some extent.
Rote learning and indoctrination progressed to stories of patriotism and
valor during the Great Patriotic War, with tales of exceptional heroism to inspire
the students to emulate them. To ensure that the proper message was getting
through, the "moral of the story" was often clearly spelled out:
You have read the last page. Together with Trubachov and his friends you
have lived through everything that came their way. You love your country
as much as they did and if danger comes, you will be ready to defend her
from her enemies, to preserve your school, your happy childhood. 27
One of the most important elements of vospitanie was miliary-patriotic
education. By the first grades of school, Soviet teachers were "directed to impress
upon the young child that each must be prepared for later military activities."28
Eight or ten years of mental preparation for military service were designed to
accustom children to the idea of military service. Reading lessons for young
children routinely included stories of heroic soldiers and young citizens. Soviet
26T.G. Ramzaeva, Russkii Yazik: Uchebnik dla 4 Klassa Chetirexhletne
Nachalnoy Shkoli, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 55.
27Helen Rapp, "Soviet Books for Children," Soviet Society: A Book of Readings,
ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston, Ma.: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1961), 444, reprinted from "Noddy and the Commissar: Soviet Children's




elementary readers devote a separate section to "Our Native Army,'' with stories
"highlighting the romance and glamour of military life and presenting the Soviet
soldier as a heroic protector of Soviet children."24 Even today, after the demise
of the Communist Party, children learn to read by "savoring such topics as
'Lenin's Childhood' or 'Lenin and the Red Army.'" 3" Older children read books
on the heroism of soldiers, Border Guards, and veterans of the Great Patriotic
War. Soviet writers rarely wrote of the hardships and human tragedies behind
these heroes. 31
Literature courses were even more susceptible to political socialization. For
much of the time, all literature courses, even those in non-Russian republics,
addressed only Russian writers. Any literature that would build national pride
was removed. As in other courses, the only subject matter considered to be
worth teaching was that which somehow contributed to the overall goal of
vospitanie . Anything that actually worked against vospitanie, for example,
literature that developed love of a national homeland as opposed to the socialist
motherland, was strictly forbidden. Literature also contributed to other elements
of vospitanie, and could easily cover most of them. Thus, national writers,
29
Jones, 151. See also Felicity Ann O'Dell, Socialization through Children's
Literature: The Soviet Example (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)):
76-88, and Charles D. Cary, "martial-patriotic themes in Soviet school textbooks,"
Soviet Union, vol. 6, pt. 1 (1979): 81-98.
^Fred Hiatt, "Moscow School Books Still Glorifying Lenin, Communism," The
Sunday Herald (8 Sep 91): 16A, from the Washington Post.
31Hermann and Dohrs, 137.
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especially those who were well known before the revolution or who had
described anti-Russian or independence efforts, were prohibited. There could not
be a "national hero" unless that person could be shown to have striven for the
Russian annexation of his homeland. The great national epics, like the Kirghiz
Manas, the Uzbek Alpamysh, and the Turkmen Korku t Ata, disappeared from
schools and libraries, to be replaced by more "politically correct" literature. 32
C. HISTORY COURSES
History courses faced the same problem as literature courses: anything
promoting or describing national pride instead of love of the socialist motherland
was mutated or abolished. In addition, the official history had to follow Marx's
concept of historical materialism. The history curriculum provided "those who
seek to shape the social environment a final opportunity to present their own
version of history and its lessons ."** (underline added) History courses in this
way provided distinct opportunities to present and nurture many of the values
of vospitanie by proving their efficacy through history. As one Soviet commented
on the role of history in the formation of a "communist world view," history
enables them to "demonstrate to the pupil the inspiring and organizational role
32Nahaylo and Swoboda, 103.
^William B. Husband, "Secondary School History Texts in the U.S.S.R.:
Revising the Soviet Past, 1985-1989," in The Russian Review Vol. 50 (October
1991): 459.
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of the Communist Party in the revolutionary transformation of the world."34
Accordingly, anything that did not contribute to this demonstration, like the truth
behind Stalin's purges and the Great Famine, was not included. 35 In even the
1988 version, World War II with its tales of Soviet heroism covers nearly one third
of a book from 1941-1986. It also contained information since discredited by
glasnost, such as the claim that Finland provoked armed conflict in 1939. The
biggest problems occur in the coverage of Stalin.
The question arises: how long will historians call the crimes of Stalin
mistakes? He and his underlings committed acts of violence upon our
people, and historians refer to these as mistakes! His military crimes are
called "miscalculations," his violence against the peasantry "excesses."
Things need to be called by their proper names. Call Stalin's actual
mistakes "mistakes," call stupidity "stupidity," and call crimes "crimes."36
Even as late as 1988, then, history was being written to accommodate the
Communist Party and vospitanie . In addition to hiding unpleasant episodes from
the past, the texts often removed anything that did not conform to their concept
of history in its march toward Communism. The national republics' histories
were immediately suspect in this if they had ever entertained any notion of
independence and prosperity without the Soviet Union. After the Great Patriotic
War, their histories were rewritten so that "the chief content of their early
^Zajda, 143.
35Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the
Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 9.
36Husband, 477.
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existence was represented exclusively as a longing for the ultimate joyous
fulfillment of their destiny, to be annexed by the Russian Empire." 17
History of course was one subject that was easily manipulated to reflect the
proper outcome and produce the proper emotions in the students. The history
curriculum in the Soviet Union has been described as "teaching a view focussing
on the defence of the country - especially Russia - against foreign aggression from
the Middle Ages to the Great Patriotic War, and emphasizing the heroism of the
Soviet people and the army."™ This was a state-propagated concept; in at least
one case, teachers were "reproached for putting too much emphasis on love of
peace as the main characteristic of Soviet foreign policy and for neglecting aspects
of national security and the need to strengthen its defence position and spirit."3**
There was evidently a fine line for Soviet teachers to walk between repeating
Soviet rhetoric on peace and producing a desire to fight.
A complicating factor in the achievement of vospitanie through history was
that the officially-approved history changed frequently. The older generation now
living in the former Soviet Union was taught three different histories: "a new
history written by Stalin, extolling his past, present and future; a newer history
produced by Khrushchev, changing that of his predecessor -- a de-Stalinized
37Nahaylo and Swoboda, 103.
^Kuebart, 105.
39Kuebart, 109, translated from R.I.Goroshko, and N.A. Shabunevich, "o
sostoyanii znanii i umenii uchashchikhsya po istorii (IX klass)', Prepodavanie
istorii v shkole 1984, No. 2, 49.
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history; and now (as of 1982), the newest and 'only true' history is that of
Brezhnev."40 Today one can also add the "new" versions that appeared under
Gorbachev, and those that are appearing as this thesis is being written, each
claiming to be more accurate than the others. The resultant confusion
undoubtedly had a negative effect on the socialization of children disillusioned
by the changes. Teachers have been complaining since 1985 that they were being
asked questions they could not answer, especially "why their version of history
had changed overnight.'""
As mentioned above, these vast revisions in official history have been
encountered before. In 1988, the cancellation of state history exams was merely
the culmination of the turmoil among professional historians. The new textbooks
had been called for several months earlier by Yegor Ligachev, and glasnost had
opened questions on every aspect of Soviet history a year or two before that. 42
However, this was not the first time: the turmoil after Stalin's death had caused
similar problems and the cancellation of university history exams in 1956. 41
While glasnost offered freedom to literature and the arts to bring out years
of work into the open, historians did not have years of work hidden away to
bring out because the state had suppressed both Union-wide data and efforts of






historians to compile bits and pieces. This, even more than before, left history
teachers with huge gaps in their information and no officially approved course
of instruction after 1988. This gave the teachers a hitherto unknown freedom to
conduct their courses in the manner they saw fit, whether it be to maintain
orthodox communist views or read the daily paper for topics. 44
D. MATH AND SCIENCE COURSES
While the use of social studies and literature courses for political
socialization is fairly obvious, subjects such as math and science definitely took
a little more thought. In the Soviet Union, however, it became not so much a
question of justifying political goals to math and science as justifying math and
science to the satisfaction of the political goals and authorities. Since industrial
growth required math, science, and technical skills in the workers, it is not
surprising that this justification was quickly established.
These subjects could fairly easily cover elements such as labor education and
professional orientation, often with almost no manipulation. Others were more
difficult, but accomplished. One chemistry syllabus gave "pride of place to the
beneficial moral and ideological effect of studying chemistry: the subject is said
to arm pupils with the knowledge and skills necessary for active participation in
the communist construction, and to contribute to the formation of a dialectical-
"Ibid., 470.
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materialist world-view and atheistic convictions."4 ' Every subject could be
related to at least one, if not several, elements of vospitanie . Atheism, for
instance, was covered with Darwinism in biology, and love of the socialist
motherland was developed by emphasizing Soviet scientists with international
accomplishments and reputations (while obviously avoiding such negative
examples from their past as Lysenko).
Mathematics fell victim to the same process. A disgruntled math teacher
wrote to the magazine Ogonek in recent years complaining about the way school
textbooks were used to "subject young minds to a thorough ideological working
over." He gave a page of satirical examples. Here are two which would shock
any American parent:
There are 300 Pioneers in the Pavlik Morozov pioneer detachment. They all
dream of repeating Pavlik's heroic deed (he shopped both his parents to the
NKVD), but not all will have the chance since two-thirds of them are being
brought up by single mothers. How many pioneers will be able to repeat
Pavlik's heroic deed?
At a closed party meeting at a tractor factory, the party organiser told
communists that a shop three kilometres from the factory had received a
supply of vodka. The communists rushed out of the factory and ran to the
shop at a speed of 20 kph. Five minutes later, non-party workers learnt of
the vodka delivery and ran to the shop at a speed of 40 kph. Who will get
the vodka first: communists or non-party workers?4 ''
45Muckle, 5.
^"New Maths," Soviet Analysis: A Fortniehtly Commentary vol. 20, No. 6 (14
August 1991): 7-8.
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The socializing impact of problems like these, repeated throughout a child's
education, can clearly be seen. While the first is openly aggressive, the second
has a hidden lesson as well: the communists got the vodka even though the non-
party workers worked twice as hard (ran twice as fast) to get there. It is also
interesting to note that what they were all rushing out to get was alcohol,
something most parents would not want their elementary school children to want
even if the parents drank it themselves.
E. LABOR EDUCATION
Another crucial element of vospitanie was labor education. A desired part
of the Soviet curriculum clear back to the Unified Labor School, the issue of
productive labor in Soviet education continued to be emphasized into the 1990s.
Newspaper articles on education inevitably included an exhortation that children
be taught the significance of their participation in the society, that "without his
concrete contribution to the common cause, something will not be constructed,
sown, or harvested."47
This element was worked into the child's education in two ways, both
indirectly and directly. Some indirect methods have been pointed out above in
other subject areas, such as the question in the reader "What is a collective?".
There were direct lessons as well. Called "labor lessons," children had them
47
"Educating the Citizen," Izvestia (20 August 1980), 1, translated in FBIS (30
September 1980), S9.
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regularly as part of the curriculum throughout their educational career. These
were often organized with the help of a local factory or farm, which sponsored
the class and hopefully supplied the students with obsolete materials and role
models for their studies. The children, for their part, were expected to produce
something socially useful, such as in simple projects or by tending small
gardens.48 These labor lessons produced some labor skills in the students, but,
more importantly, they were supposed to cultivate good work habits and a sense
of belonging to a working collective.
F. HOLIDAYS AND FIELD TRIPS
Another area subjected to mass socialization in schools was the children's
participation in holidays and field trips. Soviet children took part in holiday
celebrations as actively as American children. The key difference is that holidays
were dictated by the state, and the only ones permitted contributed somehow to
political socialization. Religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter were
replaced with politically correct holidays such as New Year's and Lenin's
Birthday. 49
48
Felicity O'Dell, "Forming Socialist Attitudes Toward Work Among Soviet
Schoolchildren," in The Making of the Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York:
Croom Helm, 1987), 86.
49John Dunstan, "Atheistic Education in the USSR," in The Making of the
Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 67.
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Some of these were specifically designed to inculcate the proper attitudes
and advance the children's military-patriotic education. One method was to
familiarize children with wartime activities that took place in their area. Many
schools developed "museums of combat glory" with their Pioneer and Komsomol
detachments. Assignments included maintaining war memorials, corresponding
with units that liberated their area during the Great Patriotic War, or research into
the units from the local area. 50 Children visited army posts, "adopted" and were
"adopted" by military units, went to war memorials, and did many other things
leading to political socialization. The reported numbers involved are huge. In
one report, 200,000 children from 815 schools in the Urals district visited army
posts in 1969 alone. In addition, millions of children went on pilgrimages to
innumerable war monuments and shrines. They stood "before symbols of death
and victory, meditated on the sacrifice of those who fell, and dedicated
themselves with fervor to serving the Soviet fatherland."" 1
Also, the Soviet Union had an inordinate number of holidays celebrating the
Armed Forces, all of which were given much attention in the schools. These
include Navy Day, Army Day, Rocket Forces Day, Air Force Day, Tank Day,
Militia Day, Recruit Day,and Victory Day, in addition to local memorials of
^ones, 152.
51Robert G. Wesson, "The Military in Soviet Society," in The Russian Review
Vol. 30 No. 2 (April 1971): 139-140.
'
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specific events/ 2 In the late 1980s, for instance, a Soviet admiral described being
"thrilled" by a "grandiose celebration dedicated to the 175th anniversary of the
famous battle of Borodino."
Many thousands of people went out that day to the field which has become
a symbol of national glory and valor, a majestic monument of two patriotic
wars. Thanks to television and radio, our whole country became, in essence,
a participant in this vivid patriotic occasion. 53
This seems a bit extreme. How could a battle , especially one considered a
Russian loss by the rest of the world and fought a hundred years before the
Soviet Union existed, be a "symbol of national glory" for the whole Soviet Union?
This celebration strongly implies that the Soviets were willing to celebrate any
military event simply for the propaganda effect, and reflects the Russo-centric
attitude that pervaded .these socialization efforts throughout the union.
G. SUMMARY
Political socialization in the schools was a constant factor throughout a
Soviet child's education. It covered the entire range from short stories in
elementary readers to comprehensive courses on Marxism- Leninism in
universities. All subjects were required to justify their existence by contributing




for this purpose. Even extra-curricular activities were officially geared to the
elements of vospitanie, even if only physical education.
30
V. MILITARY TRAINING IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
Another aspect of this socialization was military-patriotic education and
military training. This effort engulfed vast resources and amazing programs to
predispose Soviet youth to military service and develop a desire to defend the
motherland. While all aspects of vospitanie were considered important by the
Soviet regime, some had significantly more time and resources directed towards
them. One such element was the military-patriotic education of Soviet youth,
both in the school systems and in extracurricular activities. Military-patriotic
education was an integral part of the Soviet school system, the point of which
was to "influence the feelings, will, mind and physical development of pupils in
order to teach them the attitudes and knowledge necessary for defending their
homeland and the other countries of the socialist community and for providing
international assistance to young developing countries in their struggle against the
reactionary forces of imperialism. ,l54 There were undoubtedly many reasons
behind the prominence of military-patriotic education in the Soviet Union.
However, one reason was pre-eminent: the Communist Party put this element
high on the priority list, and that was sufficient to ensure its continued emphasis
in the lives of Soviet youth.
^Friedrich Kuebart, "The Political Socialization of Schoolchildren," in Soviet
Youth Culture, ed. Jim Riordan (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 105.
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The defense of the 'socialist fatherland' was routinely stated as one of the
'most important functions' of the state in the Party Program for years, and the
question of the "military-patriotic education of young people, their preparation for
service in the Army and Navy, and the development in them of a clear
understanding of their civic and military duty" was usually considered an
important part of this defense. 55 The military-patriotic education of youths
became even more important after the 1967 Law on Universal Military Obligation
reduced the period of military service for draftees. This law also made
mandatory a preinduction Basic Military Training program (NVP) for boys. 56
This training added a specific curriculum to the base of socialization provided by
years of participation in the school system and the youth groups.
The average Soviet youth faced more than 140 hours of instruction in the
"art of war". More than 50,000 military instructors were employed by the
Ministries of Education and Defense to teach children the "deadly skills of
shooting, grenade throwing, and military tactics.""'7 It was thoroughly integrated
in all grades, at skill levels appropriate to the ages involved. In addition,
"normal" academic subjects included messages building military-patriotic
"Admiral A. Sorokin, "An Assignment from the Party and the People," Sovety
Narodnykh Deputatov No. 10, 1987, 27-34, translation 'in JPRS-UMA-88-004 (29
Feb 88) "Admiral Surveys Initial Training Pluses and Minuses," 49.
^Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984), 333.
57Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer, "A New Soviet Military? The Next
Generation," in Orbis (Spring 1989), 197.
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education. Some analysts describe the lessons taught in Soviet schools as
"belligerently militaristic, not peaceful or historical", saying they celebrate victory,
rather than the cessation of fighting. 58 This is a subtle but important distinction.
A. BASIC MILITARY TRAINING
The preceding pages have described in brief the various methods used by
the school system to indirectly socialize Soviet youth in the elements of
vospitanie . The schools, however, did not stop there. After the 1967 Law on
Universal Military Service, schools were required to provide 140 hours of Basic
Military Training (NVP), plus an additional 30 hours during summer camp.^
In addition to the military training, this program was designed to supplement and
reinforce the socialization towards patriotism and respect for the armed forces
begun in the earlier years.
'
,0
It was intended to teach the following:
1. Knowledge of Soviet defence policies and the global political situation
influencing them, as well as of their ideological premises and the role
allotted to the Soviet Armed Forces.
2. Pride in the Soviet homeland, its economic and cultural achievements and
popular heroism, notions which are to arouse a willingness to continue this
work.
^Nelson and Schwartz, 199.
59
Scott, 334.
60Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military,
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 63-64.
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3. Political-ideological vigilance and willingness to defend communist ideals
actively, hatred of the imperialist class enemy.
4. Mental and physical preparedness to do military service in the Armed
Forces and, in particular, a willingness to take up the career of a serving
soldier.
"'
This program was mandatory, even for those who had graduated from an eight-
year school and were already in the work force. In addition to the school system,
all technical colleges, factories, plants, and other places of work were also
responsible for providing this training as part of their job training. These
teenagers were usually taught in DOSAAF facilities attached to the workplace.
The shift to ten-year schools made this program much easier, as the vast majority
of students were then covered by the schools and easily tracked. Reportedly,
most youngsters who went through the senior years of school from the late 1970s
on have been through the military course. 62
The program was to be taught by military instructors, preferably reserve
officers with some training in education. However, most schools were unable to
employ someone with this training, especially in remote areas. In the late 1970s,
the Ministry of Education complained that one-third of the military instructors
were reserve sergeants and soldiers and some had only a high school diploma
61Kuebart, 108, translated from A.M. Katukov and E.N. Tsvetaev, Voenno-
patrioticheskoe vospitanie uchashchikhsya na zanyatiyakh po nachalnoi voennoi
podgotivke (Moscow: Mysl, 1983), 5.
"Jones, 65.
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and two years of military service as a conscript. This was considered a serious
problem, and the state's reaction demonstrated their commitment to military-
patriotic education. The Ministry of Defense established short courses to make
these instructors reserve officers and the Ministry of Education established short
courses to certify them with teacher training. In addition, the long-term solution
led to the establishment of actual programs in pedagogical institutes to train
military instructors for this program in the school systems by the Ministries of
Education and Defense . 63
The course of instruction for NVP was not designed so much to achieve
actual military skills as to insure that every student was introduced to them, with
the assumption that they would then be more receptive to them during their
military service. In this light, it is worth examining the content of this course.
During it, students were introduced to military regulations and lifestyles, small-
caliber rifles, target practice and grenade throwing.
^Jones, 65.
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Typical NVP Course Plan<>4
Grade 9 9 10 10
Subject Boys ( iirls Boys Girls
Introduction 1 1 - -
Weapons Training 20 13 6 6
Tactical Training 4 4 6 -
Drill Training 7 - 4 -
Military topography - - 2 -
Military Medical Training 2 - - -
Civil Defense 29 29 - -
Military Technical Training - - 35 35
First aid - 16 - 19
Armed Forces Defense 4 4 7 7
Armed Forces Regulations 3 3 7 7
^Jones, 66, adapted from Uchebno-metodicheskove posobiye po nacharnoy
vovennovrpodgotovke (Moscow: Prosvesshcheniye, 1981), 227-228. Various
articles in Uchitelskava Gazeta gave slightly different numbers for specific
elements, but the total was always given as 140 hours.
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Grade 9 9 10 10
Subject Boys Girls Boys Girls
Examination - - 3 3
Total 70 70 70 70
Of course, this instruction placed a major burden on the school. Older children
actually learned to fire live ammunition, and could learn parachuting, radio
operations, martial arts, and more, all through the Soviet school system. Physical
education classes included these and other skills in addition to sports and
exercises. As noted above, however, the socialization value of this program was
considered to be much higher than the military value, even though it was
nominally instituted to replace lost service time.
These classes also provided the basis for a child to earn his or her GTO,
"Ready for Labor and Defense." This program awarded certificates to children
and adults by age groups, starting at age ten. The requirements progressed as the
child grew older, but they were all designed to develop the physical skills and at
least an awareness of the knowledge that might be needed to defend the
motherland.
The Basic Military Training was obviously an ambitious program for Soviet
schools to take up, and required resources not normally associated with a school.
37
The Ministry of Defense's Directory of External Military Training approved the
guidelines for these facilities in 1977. The ideal one included a military office,
classrooms, weapons storeroom, firing range, drill field, obstacle course, sentry
post, and an antiradiation shelter. 65 In addition, the school should have had a
civil defense classroom which also served as an antiradiation shelter, with a
"room for the head of the civil-defense headquarters, a room for the commandant,
a special room with all the equipment for the formation, for medical service,
special fire-fighting equipment, tables for each grade, drinking water, and a
special table tor determining the sizes of the means of personal protection.
"
I> ' >
However, with the perpetual economic problems of the Soviet Union, it
should be no surprise that many schools never acquired these facilities, much less
the equipment for them. Tellingly, there were more news articles on the lack of
these facilities than their presence. For example, three years after the new law
went into effect, one oblast was short 103 target ranges, 121 tactical and civil




This problem was supposed to have been taken care of by
rotating students from deficient schools through facilities at other schools in the
area. Nor was this a problem limited to remote areas: in Moscow, 43 percent of
65
Jones, 66.
^Nelson and Schweizer, 199.
67G. Chernyshev, "Changes Would be More Noticeable," Voyenniye Znanive
No. 2 (Feb 89): 8-9, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-014, "Lack of Facilities Noted," (3
Jun 89): 46.
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schools lacked gymnastic facilities and 60 percent did not have obstacle
courses.
68
In addition, there were less than 16 percent of the NVP training
facilities required tor the number of students in Moscow in 1989. (,g This lack
undoubtedly affected the training of the students going through the program.
B. CIVIL DEFENSE
As mentioned above, in addition to the social studies classes and efforts to
improve vospitanie within standard classes, the Soviets included classes
specifically geared to vospitanie in their curriculum. These were those devoted
to civil defense and military training. These mainly served to accomplish the
military-patriotic education and develop patriotism, but also supported other
elements such as physical education and socio-political awareness. Civil defense
training showed up in a child's education well before the military training.
However, in the last two years of school, civil defense came under the purview
of Basic Military Training.
The child was introduced to civil defense training by the third grade. This
training was to teach the child protect him- or herself "against weapons of mass
destruction," "resolutely exposing the aggressive essence of imperialism" and
^Col Res F. Semyanovskiy, "Conscript from Moscow. How He Is Prepared
for Military Service," Krasnava Zvezda (29 Apr 89): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-
012, "Moscow Area Given Low Marks for Pre-Draft Training," (22 May 89): 29.
69Lt Col G. Petrenko, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil No. 5 (Mar 89): 39-46,
translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011, "Leaders of Moscow Commissariat Detail State
of Pre-Draft Training," (15 May 89): 67.
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introducing to the child's mind the "sinister prospects of nuclear war caused by
international imperialism". From the third to eighth grades, children spent 35
hours a year learning how to protect themselves from chemical and nuclear
weapons. In the last two grades, civil defense was included in Basic Military
Training. 70
The instruction on civil defense was amazingly in depth. The Elementary
Military Training textbook from 1979 went into considerable detail on the effects
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, especially on the human body,
based on Soviet experiments. It also gave a "second-by-second account of the
damage caused by a nuclear explosion to buildings and people." This textbook
included some extremely unrealistic instructions to the students in case of a
nuclear attack:
Having noticed the flash of a nuclear explosion you must quickly lie face
down with feet toward the explosion, availing yourself of any nearby dips
and of protection. In this way it is possible to reduce the likelihood of being
hit by the shock wave and even completely void it. In addition, you should
turn up your greatcoat collar and protect your hands under yourself; to
avoid losing your sight, cover the face well. Immediately after the shock
wave passes you must at once get up and continue to carry out your
military mission. 71
70Nelson and Schweizer, 201.
71
"Bringing Up Ivan: Military Training (2)," Soviet Analysis Vol. 11 No. 6 (24
Mar 82): 5.
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It would have been very interesting to watch the Soviet students that read
between the lines and realized that the shock wave was not the only destructive
effect of a nuclear weapon! Recently, in 1988, a directive of the USSR State
Committee of People's Education, the USSR Chief ol Civil Defense, the USSR
Health Ministry, and the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent mandated
several changes in the civil defense program for students. A major change was
that, for the first time, civil defense was applied to peacetime. It then addressed
actions to protect themselves and others during natural disasters, accidents and
similar events. 2
C. SUMMARY
Military-patriotic -education was a high priority in the Soviet Union. In
addition to Basic Military Training, it kept alive the memory of fallen comrades
and urged children to view them as heros to emulate. Their methods involved
all aspects of a young person's structured life: school, extra-curricular activites,
and youth groups. Both military-patriotic education and Basic Military Training
were designed to promote "patriotism and respect for the armed forces" and
conditioning young men to accept military service as the only honorable course.
^Civil Defense Department, "New Programs," Voyennyye Znaniva (Mar 89):




The second major source of vospitanie for Soviet youth was the vouth group
appropriate to the child's age. These groups were the Little Octobrists, ages seven
to ten; the Young Pioneers, ages ten to fifteen; and the Komsomol, ages fourteen
to twenty six.'
1
Set up in conjunction with the schools, and supported by them,
these groups were not administered under the school hierarchy, but under the
aegis of the Communist Party. These youth groups were almost exclusively
dedicated to the goals of vospitanie.
A. THE LITTLE OCTOBRISTS
The first of these the child encountered were the Little Octobrists. All
children were expected to be Little Octobrists, which is where the child began his
"education in civic responsibility."74 Their first introduction to this education
were the Rules of the Octobrists:
• An Octobrist is a future Pioneer.
• An Octobrist is a diligent child, loves school, and respects his elders.
73
Kitty Weaver, Russia's Future: The Communist Education of Soviet Youth
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 5.
74Merle Fainsod, "The Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship," in Soviet
Society: A Book of Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston, Ma.:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), 155, reprinted from "The Komsomols: A Study
of Youth Under Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Vol. 45 (1951),
18-40.
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• Only those who love work are called Octobrists.
• An Octobrist is truthful and brave, dextrous and smart.
• An Octobrist is a friendly child, reads and draws, plays and sings, lives a
merry life. '
These rules fit the Soviet scheme of political socialization for children very well.
They were directed toward building the basic values need for future vospitanie :
self-discipline, respect for authority, and love of work.
Octobrist groups were formed in all schools, usually by grade and class.
Schools activities were supported by them, as well as supporting them. For
instance, the Octobrists were encouraged to handle simple discipline problems
among themselves, and encouraged the children to study hard. For their part, the
schools supported the Octobrists by providing classrooms and materials,
encouraging the view that everyone should join, and helped promote the same
values. Readers frequently included questions like "What is the meaning of the
Octobrists?" and "What obligations do you owe the red star, and how do you
fulfill these obligations?"7'' These Octobrist groups also took the lead in





B. THE YOUNG PIONEERS
This education continued in the Young Pioneers. The Pioneers were also
organized through the schools, by grade and class. Each school was supposed to
have a paid senior Pioneer leader who had completed a special pedagogical
institute. There were over a hundred such schools for training these leaders, as
well as a correspondence course.77
The Pioneer Laws reflected the older age of Pioneers, as well as a higher
degree of political socialization.
The Pioneer is true to the working class.
The Pioneer is a friend and brother to every Pioneer and Komsomol.
The Pioneer is honest and thruthful. His word is like granite.
The Pioneer is disciplined.
The Pioneer daily helps his fellow workers to build a Communist society.
The Pioneer loves work and respects useful labor.
The Pioneer is pure in thought, word, and deed. 7«
The Pioneer handbook, Tovarishch, definitely included obvious elements of
vospitanie, providing young people a detailed explanation of the roles and




Internal Troops, and pictures of military equipment, ranks, and insignia. 79 Their
slogan, part of the initiation ceremony, was "To battle for Lenin and Stalin --be
ready!" with the new Pioneers answering with the slogan on their badge "Always
ready!"80
Among the many activities they provided for Pioneers were the Zarnitsa, or
"summer lightning" games. The greatest achievement of the Zarnitsa program
was considered to be the "development of a strong and positive attitude toward
the security of the country and a continuing consciousness of the need to be
prepared to defend the Soviet homeland against all enemies."81 Started in 1967,
these took place at Pioneer camps during school vacations and were competitive
war games for Soviet youth. In 1983, more than fifteen million children took part
in these wargames in "battalions" almost exactly replicating those in the Soviet
Armed Forces. s: The teams were opposing forces who usually fought to capture
the other team's flag. The teams were originally the "Reds" and the "Whites";
however, since the "Whites" sometimes won and the "Reds" could lose (a
horrendous concept to a properly-brought-up young Communist!) they changed
the colors to blue and white. The finals were nationwide, and very similar to
military exercises. They included generals as advisors, and aircraft, tanks and live
^Scott, 331.
^Fainsod, 155. Stalin was removed from the slogan in 1956.




ammunition for added realism. Other games focused on more current (1940s and
1950s) enemies and were similarly realistic, like "Catch the Spies" which included
mock trials and executions. 83
C. THE KOMSOMOL
Zarnitsa was so successful for the Pioneers that the Komsomol version,
Orlenok, was introduced in 1972. 84 Since the "first obligation of the Komsomol
was to prepare himself for service in the Soviet Army/' these games fit right in
the program. s> They included live firings, competitions, marches, and tactical
games, all "designed to prepare the youth for military service and to contribute
to the premilitary training program."86 More than 35 million young people
attended these camps annually. 87 In addition, Komsomol members were much
of the staff of the Pioneer camps and zarnitsa games.
D. DOSAAF
Another source of extra-curricular military-patriotic education for youth was
the paramilitary organization DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with
the Army, Air Force, and Fleet). DOSAAF units provided teens and adults the
"Hermann and Dohrs, 140.




87Nelson and Schweizer, 203.
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opportunity to learn more advanced military skills. Membership was open to any
Soviet citizen age 14 and older. Their activities included: "military-patriotic
education of workers and young students; preparing lads for actual military
service in the USSR Armed Forces; training cadres of mass technical occupations
having military-related importance for the national economy; assisting in civil
defense measures; developing technical and applied military sports in the country;
strengthening the material and technical base."H8 In the late 1980s, DOSAAF had
attracted over 100 million members, and had resources including 39,000 motor
vehicles, 20,000 carts, 52,000 amateur radios, and about 7,000 aircraft. DOSAAF
routinely claimed to have trained about one-third of the draftees in military
specialties.
89 However, some DOSAAF training was apparently mandatory,
which would make the membership levels less impressive. Communist Party,
trade union, economic, and especially Komsomol organizations were required to
assist DOSAAF in its efforts to properly socialize and train the younger
generation.
1
* DOSAAF also often ran the NVP programs for young men who
had left school before finishing, and worked with the Party to run the summer
^"USSR DOSAAF Regulation," Voyennyye Znaniya No. 3 (Mar 89): 21-24,
translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011, "Changes in DOSAAF Regulation Detailed" (15
May 89): 56-57.
89
"Roundtable of DOSAAF Candidates for People's Deputies," Krasnaya
Zvezda (12 Mar 89): 1-2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011 (15 May 89): 73.
^Robert G. Wesson, "The Military in Soviet Society," in The Russian Review
Vol. 30 No. 2 (April 1971): 140.
47
Zarnitsa and Orlenok camps. In addition, DOSAAF had camps and schools of its
own, training young people in one of 40 military specialties. 41
Finally, if these organizations were not enough, these were several thousand
military-patriotic associations or clubs available to youth interested in more
military-patriotic education. By mid-1990, there were almost 4,000 of these
"unofficial" clubs in the Soviet Union. A statute apparently put these clubs under
the Komsomol, but they went beyond the Komsomol bureaucracy almost
immediately. These clubs were usually led by men recently released from active
duty.92 The most sinister of these was the "Young Friends oi the Border
Guards." They actually played games with Border Guards and dogs following
a "frontier transgressor" and arresting him!43 Others included the "Young
Friends of the Soviet Army" and the more benign "Red Scouts," a group that tried
to protect historical evidence of battles from the civil war and the Great Patriotic
War94 . These groups were still being formed in the last few years. For example,
an All-Union Naval Youth League was created in 1990. The goal of this
organization was to "teach a new generation about the best traditions of the Soviet
91
Jones, 69.
92Col O. Sholmov, '"How Much Can Enthusiasm be Exploited?' or 'How To
Help the Military-Patriotic Clubs?'", Krasnaya Zvezda (25 Apr 90): 2, translated
inJPRS-UMA-90-013, "Growth of Military-Patriotic Clubs, Associations" (4 Jun 90):
90.
93Nelson and Schweizer, 203, from Riga Domestic Service (24 May 17)
translated in BBC: SOV (1 Sep 87).
94Kuebart, 106.
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Navy, to teach young people about the rudiments of the sailor's trade, and to
prepare them for service in the Navy."95
E. SUMMARY
The youth groups were designed to include young people in the struggle to
achieve communism. The three levels were split by age groups, and became
more selective as they grew. The Octobrists and Young Pioneers were universal
socializing groups; the Komsomols were the training ground for future Party
members. Youth group activities worked with the schools to attract children to
communism. DOSAAF, which was geared to older youth and adults, focussed
on military, patriotic and civil defense activities and training.
95Sr Lt A. Kryshtal, "For You Who Love the Sea," Krasnaya Zvezda (26 Apr
90): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-90-021, "All-Union Naval Youth League Created"
(20 Sep 90): 80.
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VII. SUCCESS?
The overall goal of all this was, of course, the proper upbringing of the next
generation to carry on the communist revolution and the Soviet Union. Prior to
the fall of 1991, many people thought the Soviets were successful in this effort.
One such person was Victor Hermann, an American who had lived there as a
Soviet citizen for most of his life. In 1982, after returning to the United States, he
wrote:
The vast majority of Soviet peoples, however, do function as Man Machines
today -- as their parents and grandparents functioned since the time of
Lenin — whether they realize it or not. Effective conditioning bv the rules
of the Kremlin limits the people's perception of the realities of their own
lives so much that Man Machines is a valid conception and description. 1"'
Years earlier, the U.S. Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare thought this socialization potent enough to represent a threat to the
United States, and funded several reports on Soviet education.
1
'7 Today,
however, this is no longer an obvious, or even reasonable, conclusion.
With the increasing impact of glasnost, people outside the Soviet Union have
been questioning the effectiveness of the years of socialization. It is difficult, if
%Hermann, 9.
97Several reports are avilable, from Education in the USSR, from the US Dept
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bulletin 1957, No. 14 (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1957) to "Report on Russia By Vice Admiral Hyman
G. Rickover, USN," Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, 86th Congress, (Washington: US Government Printing Office,
1959).
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not impossible, to determine the effectiveness of vospitanie a generation or two
ago because the strict enforcement of Soviet law did not allow for the expression
of personal opinions that could have shown any failures. Today it is still difficult,
if not impossible, to determine the success of vospitanie in a population as large
and varied as the former Soviet Union. Sociology as a science left much to be
desired in that country, due in large part to political repression throughout much
of its history. With the advent of Gorbachev and glasnost on the political scene,
however, polls have become more widespread and accepted. Two Soviet
sociological institutions, the Institute of Sociology and the Center of Public
Opinion Studies, began conducting polls on politically sensitive issues early in
Gorbachev's regime.
1
'8 The lack of expertise and resources, however, makes most
of these opinion polls somewhat less than trustworthv as scientific evidence.
They are blatantly inadequate to judge the success of vospitanie because they
invariably focus on small parts that cannot even pretend to be representative of
all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. In addition, polls are not available on
many of the elements of vospitanie . With this in mind, this report includes other,
equally unscientific, data in the hope of broadening the picture.
Today, it is obvious that the Communists did not completely succeed in
their efforts at vospitanie , since the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party
ceased to exist as a political entity in the end of 1991. However, some important
98Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Glasnost and Polling," The Christian Science Monitor,
2 November 1989, 19.
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elements of vospitanie may have had a significant impact in spite of the noted
lack of success with overall results. The issue now is how many elements, and
which ones, may have successfully socialized large portions of the population in
a way that has the potential to impact their interactions in the international arena.
Those elements that have been directed toward international issues in the history
of the Soviet Union seem to have the the largest potential to do so in the future.
They are: socio-political education, patriotic-international education, military-
patriotic education, labor/economic education. To attempt to determine the
extent of any success, this paper will examine various indicators for each element
separately.
A. SOCIO-POLITICAL EDUCATION
This is one element that can easily be seen as an ironic partial success.
Designed to "make citizens politically active and literate," they definitely
succeeded in doing so, although with somewhat different results than may have
been anticipated. The people participating in Moscow in the summer of 1991
were politically aware and active in fighting against a coup that would have
brought back communism. However, that was a very small percentage of the
population. For the most part, the rest of the city, not to mention the country,
went on with their daily lives, hardly sparing a second glance at the commotion
and definitely not giving up their place in line for it. Those politically active and
aware on communism's side appeared in equally small numbers. Now that the
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Communist Party is no longer in control of heir careers, few seem to care. The
attempt by some to revive the old Soviet parliament in the "Extraordinary Sixth
Congress of the People's Deputies of the U.S.S.R." in March is one example: only
217 (of 2,250) delegates elected under communism showed up w
B. PATRIOTIC-INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
The major indicator here is rising nationalism. While Soviet patriotism was
prevalent in ethnic Russians, for their motherland, il was widely lacking in other
ethnic groups feeling no bond to Mother Russia. Its failure in the non-Russian
areas became blatantly obvious with the tenacity with which nationalities within
the Soviet Union pushed for independence. Even areas with a high concentration
of ethnic Russians, such as eastern Ukraine, voted to separate based on economic
issues, evidencing a lack of patriotism to the motherland.
This is not entirely surprising since the vast majority of Soviet patriotic
education was based on Russian heros and Russian nationalism, and the
nationalities were frequently persecuted by the Soviets. This left the various
nationalities feeling that their national existence was threatened by the Soviets,
not protected by them as their rhetoric claimed. In addition, the Soviets, and the
Russians before them, did not have a wonderful legacy in the area of managing
non-Russian territories that would induce them to remain loyal to Moscow.
"Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Die-Hards Fume By Candlelight," The New York
Times, 18 March 1992, A3.
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C. MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION
The military-patriotic education of the next generation of Soviets swallowed
up untold resources throughout the years. Whether or not their efforts actually
achieved this goal is another issue. During the final vears of the Soviet Union,
various factors seemed to indicate that this attempt at socialization was falling
apart. This section will investigate three. The first is the increasing number of
young people and their parents who would prefer to serve in national forces,
rather than the Soviet forces defending the Soviet Union as a whole, much less
other socialist states. The second is the increasing number of draft dodgers and
deserters during this period, which indicates a failure to convince young people
of the necessity of military service at all costs. The third significant indication of
the failure of military-patriotic education was the training status of draftees at the
time of their induction.
First, rising nationalism had been a growing problem in the Soviet Union for
years. This is a topic well beyond the scope of this study. Pertinent here,
however, is nationalism's effect on Soviet patriotism. Patriotism, to the Soviet
Union, was an obvious element of vospitanie, but apparently not particularly well
thought out in its implementation. A desire to serve in one's own republic, or
even in a military of that republic, had been growing for several years prior to the
break-up of the union. This was clearly seen in a 1990 survey of preinductees in
Georgia and Tajikistan. The survey showed a "substantial number who had a
positive attitude toward the creation of ethnic military formations and expressed
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a desire to perform their military service solely within their own republics. "" )0
This was an indication that patriotism to the Soviet Union had not been
successfully inculcated in the youth, not to mention a failure in the "clarification
of the constitutional duties of each Soviet citizen in regard to the defense of the
socialist fatherland." 101 An investigation in the early 1980s showed that the vast
quantity of military-patriotic education had
not succeeded in giving all pupils a clear idea of Soviet defence policies.
The ideological foundations of military policies and Lenin's statements on
the country's defence apparently remained too abstract for manv pupils and
failed to have a motivating effect on their attitudes to military service; they
did not seem to view the world' military situation as so threatening as to
make them take a particular interest in it. 102
Recently, another aspect of this issue arose. With the break-up of the Soviet
Union, several ex-republics began accepting Soviet military personnel in their
forces if they would take a loyalty oath. The case in point is Ukraine. It is
enlightening to note that many more have taken the oath than represent the
ethnic Ukrainians in the Soviet military. The Commonwealth of Independent
States Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov told Izvestia that as of January 3, 1992,
75 percent of the officers in Ukraine were ethnic Russians. However, the
100,,On Compliance with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers Decree 'On Preparation of Young People of Preinduction and Induction
Age for Active Military Service in the USSR Armed Forces' (CPSU Central
Committee Secretariat Resolution, 23 March 1990)," Izvestia TsK KPSS, No. 4 (4
Apr 90), 7-10, translated in "Monitoring Central Committee Resolutions," JPRS-




Ukrainians have reported that 3,200 officers have taken the oath, and only 850
refused and were returned to Russia. 103 Many factors of course affect their
choice, including the possibility of unemployment in a devastated economy.
However, other members of the Commonwealth are beginning similar processes,
apparently confident that they will attract enough officers for their military
forces. 104
The next second indicator is the draft response. This indicator reflects a
lagging change in attitudes, because there are still laws with a threat of
prosecution mandating service. However, in spite of this, there were increasing
numbers of draft dodgers and deserters. In 1989, some 7500 youths resisted
conscription according to official figures. Other reports, however, put this figure
at 5,000 for Lithuania alone. 105 A sample poll of young people in Moscow
resulted in a third of the respondents saying they did not see a need for military
service. 106 In a poll of inductees' parents taken in 1990 in the Georgian, Tajik,
and Uzbek SSRs, and in Voronezh, Grodno, and Transcarpathian oblasts, over 20
percent did not want their sons to serve in the army- In Georgia, one-third of the
103Stephen Foye and Douglas L. Clarke, ed., "Military and Security Notes,"
Radio Liberty Research Report .
104
Scott, H.F., "The 16th Republic," Air Force Times (February 1992): 36.
105William Odom, "Soviet Military in Transition," Problems of Communism




young people expressed an "unwillingness to serve."'"' However, other factors
also affect draft responses. A major one is that manv fear harsh treatment, injury
or even death at the hands of older servicemen in the current military system.
The third indicator of the failure of the military-indoctrination program was
the training status of the inductees when they reported. Theoretically, a
successful indoctrination program would produce communities that ensured their
young men were prepared for military service. However, that was frequently not
the case, strongly implying that preparing the youth for military service was not
high on their priority list. A Central Committee Secretariat resolution on the
implementation of the 1986 law noted that 45 percent of young men being
inducted into the Armed Forces in 1990 could not "fulfill the standard GTO series
of exercises, shoot poorlv and cannot swim." 108 The statistics were even worse
from rural areas, where they did not have the resources to do the training, even
if they had been so inclined.
With these indications of the lack of success, if not outright failure, of
vospitanie in accomplishing its goal of military-patriotic education, is it reasonable
107Col Res F. Semyanovskiy, "Conscript from Moscow. How He Is Prepared
for Military Service," Krasnaya Zvezda (29 Apr 89): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-
012, "Moscow Area Given Low Marks for Pre-Draft Training/' (22 May 89): 29.
108
"On Compliance With the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers Decree 'On Preparation of Young People of Preinduction and Induction
Age for Active Military Service in the USSR Armed Forces' (CPSU Central
Committee Secretariat Resolution, 23 March 1990)," Izvestia TsK KPSS, No. 4 (4
Apr 90), 7-10,translated in "Monitoring Central Committee Resolutions," JPRS-
UMA-90-012-L (29 Oct 90), 34.
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to assume any impact on future interactions with the former Soviets? Perhaps
not. For all the vears of rhetoric against the capitalist West, the former republics
are racing to develop friendships with western powers. They have applied to
NATO, and ten republics have joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe.m U.S. officers seen in uniform in Russia are mobbed by people
wanting autographs and treated as heros. Provide Hope missions are welcomed
by cheering crowds in St. Petersburg. 110 However, there is a pocket of resistance
to the change: in spite of the fact that their political leaders have said they have
no enemies, the military officers still reportedly see the United States and NATO
as "potential military adversaries." 111
D. LABOR/ECONOMIC EDUCATION
The effects of labor and economic education are more likely to be felt in
internal issues than in international affairs. However, their need for foreign aid
has made these effects an issue for the western world's consideration as well. The
socialization of children toward work in a collective and against the evils of
capitalism will undoubtedly be felt for years to come. These effects can already
109Thomas L. Freidman, "10 Ex-Soviet Republics Gain Wider Recognition," The
New York Times, 31 January 92, A6. Georgia, involved in internal strife, was left
out.
n0Col. John Piazza, "Provide Hope 'a mission of a lifetime"', Air Force Times
(April 20, 1992): 13.
mDoug Clarke, "Union of Officers Sees US/NATO Threat," Radio Liberty
Daily Report, (16 Mar 92).
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be seen in the slow pace of economic reform, and the reluctance ot many to go
solo in business or agriculture, much less industry. Tolls in 1989 showed that the
ideas of price decontrols, worker-owned factories, and private property were
growing, but very slowly- They are up against "a deeply ingrained feeling of
dependency on the central government and a powerful distaste for letting some
get richer than others." In the poll, 47 percent said the state should set firm prices
for all goods, no matter who produced hem. Forty percent wanted the return of
a "strong hand" of the state and another twenty percent wanted the "government
to keep everyone at roughly an equal level."" 2
In 1991, the Soviet people were by no means completely free from the effects
of vospitanie . Months after the demise of the Communist Party, the Russian
Congress "balked at changing an article that would have allowed private
ownership of land." This was after three days of intense politics that came close
to reversing Yeltsin's economic reforms. 113 Similar attitudes can be seen in the
congresses of other ex-Soviet republics as well. In Kazakhstan, the Parliament is
described as being caught in "old Soviet incantations about the Motherland" and
112
Bill Keller, "Soviet Poll Finds Deep Pessimism Over Gorbachev's Economic
Plan," The New York Times, 5 November 1989, Al. The poll was conducted by
the National Public Opinion Research Center for the chairman of the State
Committee on Economic Reform, Leonid I. Abalkin, and based on personal
interviews of 1,148 Soviets in 16 large and small cities in September and October
1989.
113Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin Gives Parliament a Scolding," The New York
Times, 22 April 92, A6.
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"balking at the truly private farm ownership". However, there, as elsewhere, the
people have realized that they could lose their jobs when industries privatize,
introducing a reluctance to leave communist economics that goes considerably
beyond communist socialization. 114 This attitude, however, is likely to be
strongest in the weakest areas of the economy: those without the skills, education
or energy to adapt to a competitive market economy and those of retirement or
near-retirement age who will not have an opportunity to succeed in a new
system. 1 1S All of these people will be able to vote and, being unemployed, will
have a lot of time to vocalize their displeasure with the new system. If this group
opposing market reforms becomes more numerous or visible than those
supporting Boris Yeltsin, foreign aid will be affected, which in turn will affect
diplomatic relations with western countries limiting aid.
There is also another economic issue that will impact their international
relations. That is the people's reaction to foreign investment. A survey
conducted recently showed that 40 percent of the people "expressed fear that their
government was yielding control of the economy to foreign investors." It is
interesting to note that this resistance is strongest in industries associated with
114Francis X. Clines, "Kazakhs Seek a Level Capitalist Road," The New York
Times, 27 January 92, A5.
115Carla Thorson, "Unemployment Growing in Russia," Radio Liberty Daily
Report (Dec 20, 1991).
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natural resources, such as oil and gas. 116 This could be the result of several
factors: political socialization against capitalist systems, dire economic conditions,
and disastrous environmental leftovers from Communism.
E. SUMMARY
Only the passage of time will reveal the whole truth behind the political
socialization of youth in the Soviet Union. Some elements obviously did not
achieve complete success. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the
increasing draft resistance of the past five years, seriously questions the
effectiveness of the military-patriotic education. The rush to independence for the
ex-Soviet republics and the subsequent nationalistic fervor pervading the region
dispels the significance_of their internationalist training. The slow change of the
economy in the bulk of these nations reflects more a lack of information and fear
of the unknown than confidence in the communist system.
n6Bruce Weber, "Many in Former Soviet Lands Say They Feel Even More
Insecure Now," The New York Times, 23 April 92, A3.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This is, of course, by no means an all-inclusive description of the
indoctrination efforts that were at work in the Soviet Union. There were probably
as many indoctrination techniques as there were people in the Communist Party.
Also, the methods described here did not necessarily apply to every young Soviet.
Differences were based on resources and priorities, and thus the "universal"
program fell far short of its billing. However, political socialization was definitely
a priority at some level. For instance, some type of preinduction training and
military-patriotic education certainly were part of everyone's life. As seen above,
the success of this program is questionable. Obviously, they did not develop
Soviet patriotism and a desire to defend the socialist motherland in all young
people. The eruption of independence-seeking nations throughout even the ex-
Soviet republics indicates that they did not achieve internationalism. Apparently,
they did not even achieve enough success for these issues to overcome the
economic and social realities of life in recent times.
Why this lack of success in vospitanie? There are undoubtedly as many
reasons as there are people involved. Reports from DOSAAF organizations show
that interest in military training has dropped considerably. While the numbers
of participants often look good on paper, it was usually the same youth who
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participated in everything, not all youth participating in at least something. 117
The youth groups faced similar problems. While children eagerly joined the
Octobrists, interest dropped off drastically for the Komsomol. There was
apparently a cut-off point about the age of fifteen, after which the majority of
youth were no longer significantly swayed by the youth groups.
"
s
Another factor was the idealism of the youth; "they tended to expect more
from the leadership because, at that time, they still firmly believed in
socialism." 119 However, they were soon disillusioned. They became aware of
the hypocrisy of adult society, and the existence of a facade that was very
different from reality. As one dissident put it "The ideology I was taught in
school and the life I knew were in glaring contradiction." 120 This contradiction,
and the hypocrisy with which the authorities faced it, soon undermined and
repudiated years of vospitanie .
Glasnost had a significant effect as well. As society became more open
about life in general, and abuses by the Communist Party in particular, the
n7
I. Chikomasova, "At a Crawl: Progress of the Kursk Industrial Rayon
Committee of DOSAAF," Voyennvve Znaniva, No. 2 (Feb 89), 10-11, translated in
JPRS-UMA-89-014 (3 Jun 89), 49.
u8Jim Riordan, "The Komsomol," in Soviet Youth Culture, Jim Riordan, ed.
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 37.
119Tanya Frisby, "Soviet Youth Culture," in Soviet Youth Culture, Jim Riordan,
ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 2.
120Leonid Plyushch, History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography, trans.
Marco Carynnyk (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 9.
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propaganda had increasingly less effect. A similar circumstance was seen with
World War II, when the soldiers exposed to the West saw life under capitalism
to be different from the way the Communist Party described it. With increasing
accessibility to foreign media, the Soviet public was less and less dependent on
government news sources. Glasnost added to this the possibility of the
widespread exchange of information among Soviets without the effect of
government censorship. People soon realized that problems they thought were
unique to their small area were in fact plaguing people throughout the country.
The more this happened, the more people began to blame the communist system
for breeding corruption, in addition to the corrupt officials with whom they had
to deal. After years of tolerating small lies, the people were suddenly awakened
to the fact that they were huge lies, especially about Stalin, spread right from the
very start. People rapidly became disillusioned with their government and the
Communist Party.
This does not mean, however, that the years of growing up under
communism did not socialize the people. The inertia is tremendous. A country
the size of Russia will take years, possibly even generations, to complete the
change to democracy, and their communist upbringing can only make this more
difficult. However, this research suggests that this background affected the ex-
Soviets more by denying them other information than by convincing them that
the communist information was correct. The complete lack of knowledge on
market economies, private enterprise, and democratic procedures is only the
64
beginning. In this case, Boris Yeltsin is a prime example: he has "repeatedly
demonstrated that however strong his devotion to democracy or private
enterprise, his understanding of them is shaky." 121
121Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin's Ambiguity Persists: Democrat Who Rules By
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